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I. INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY 
On May 9, 1979, Speaker McCarthy created the Assembly 
Committee on Fuel Scarcity to examine shortages of refined 
petroleum products which had begun to disrupt the social and 
economic well being of Californians. In announcing the creation 
of this special legislative committee, the Speaker explained: 
"Millions of Californians are confused 
and angry. They are victims of a 
chaotic fuel supply situation they do 
not understand ... (and) they are entitled 
to answers ... " 
This report summarizes the Committee's efforts, as of 
July 1979, to fulfill this charge. 
An exhaustive analysis by the Committee of all aspects 
of the fuel scarcity situation proved infeasible. The complexity 
of this problem has resulted in an ever-increasing web of re-
lated issues for the Committee to consider. Events of a global, 
national, regional, state and facility-by-facility nature are 
involved. The Committee's staff therefore approached the in-
vestigation by focusing on three fundamental areas of inquiry: 
1) crude oil supplies; 2) refinery capabilities and per-
formance; and 3) demand for gasoline. 
Staff focused on these three areas, rather than others, 
after a preliminary analysis indicated that they include the 
basic aspects of the fuel scarcity subject which are unique to 
California. Several important factors not treated herein in-
elude the intricate and ever-changing federal allocation and 
1-1 
price control programs, the state's utilization of its "set 
aside" in the federal allocation program, the Governor's odd-
even program, competing intrastate demands between farmers and 
truckers for diesel fuel which emerged in late June, and the 
number of retail service station closings in California. 
In spite of this focused approach, there are still 
many questions which remain unanswered and no single cause or 
factor completely explains why California has experienced a 
fuel scarcity. It is unlikely that any one explanation will 
ever satisfactorily answer the question "What went wrong?" for 
those who have had to sit in gasoline lines. 
Mr. Charles Warren, the Special Emissary of the 
President to California on fuel issues, indicated in testimony 
to the Committee that the shortfall of allocated gasoline in 
California had reached 70,000 b/d in May, 1979, when compared 
to May 1978. This figure excludes 1979 gasoline demand in excess 
of 1978 levels. As it is difficult at best to estimate what 
that additional increment of demand actually was (distinguishing 
tank-topping, industrial stockpiling, and general panic buying 
from natural increases in consumption), the true extent of the 
California shortage is unknown. 
However, the Committee investigation has resulted in 
the isolation of significant trends which contributed to the 
overall fuel scarcity problem. Aspects of crude oil supplies, 
refining and demand, all appeared to have had an effect upon 
the overall situation. 




0 CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES. First quarter 1979 
California crude oil supplies remained 
at levels similar to those at the end of 
1978. Imports of foreign crude oil into 
California for the first quarter of 1979 
actually increased over year-end 1978 
levels. The Iranian crisis therefore did 
not result in reduced imports into Cali-
fornia during the first quarter of 1979. 
On the national level, 1979 imports and 
domestic production have declined from 
1978 year-end levels. While the reduction 
in imports appears to be a consequence of 
the Iranian revolution's impact on the world 
crude oil market, the drop in domestic pro-
duction is unexplained. In addition, crude 
oil stocks which were drawn down substantially 
in 1978 have been increasing since the be-
ginning of 1979. 
0 REFINING. In 1979 United States refineries 
have been utilized at rates below 1978 year-
end levels. West Coast refining capacity, 
of which California refineries comprise 80%, 
has operated at monthly utilization rates 
1-3 
ranging between 81 and 85% during 1979. 
California gasoline production dropped 21% 
between December 1978 and March 1979, while 
residual fuel oil production increased. 
Gasoline inventories were more heavily util-
ized in this period, but it does not appear 
that minimum operating levels were reached 
on an industry-wide basis. 
Heavy crude oil, thought by some to have 
only recently arrived on the California 
market, has long been used by California 
refineries. Since the completion of the Trans-
Alaskan Pipeline, in the summer of 1977, heavy 
crude oil has comprised a major portion of 
California refinery inputs. Though great un-
certainty is voiced by industry representatives 
about the ability of California refineries to 
process heavy crude oil, several large California 
refineries are relying predominately on heavy 
crude oils for their refinery feedstocks. 
Federal price and State environmental regulations 
have been represented as major obstacles pre-
venting the industry from modifying refineries to 
more efficiently utilize heavy crude oils. How-
ever, a number of California refiners, particularly 
smaller independent companies, have begun to modify 
and expand their facilities to allow for more 
efficient utilization of heavy crude oils. 
0 DEMAND FOR REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. 
Purchases of gasoline by the ultimate 
consumer are not recorded or compiled by 
any central organization. Demand is evalu-
ated by measurements of taxable distribu-
tions, i.e., the tax per volume of refined 
petroleum products transferred from the 
refinery to the first purchaser in the 
distribution system. While the recorded 
distributions for January and February 1979 
were unusually high, distributions for 
March and April declined significantly to 
levels .6, and .3 percent above 1978 levels. 
May 1979 distributions were 2.8% less than 
those in May 1978. 
Growth in the California economy, population, 
registered vehicles, and outstanding drivers' 
licenses at rates in excess of national levels 
could easily account for the increased distri-
butions in March and April. In addition, 
there are indications that commercial pur-
chasers (vehicle fleet operators) took notice 
of the Iranian situation earlier than other 
consumers and increased the frequency and 
quantity of their fuel purchases, which could 
account for a significant portion of the in-
creased distributions in January and February. 
1-5 
Of great significance to an understanding 
of the fuel scarcity is the fact that 
California is the major gasoline supplier 
for much of PADD 5. Increases in gasoline 
exports to other states, combined with re-
duced imports into California from the 




II. CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES 
o Total California crude oil receipts 
0 
0 
through March 1979 remained relatively 
constant. Foreign crude oil receipts 
actually increased slightly during the 
same period. 
1979 United States crude oil imports 
and production declined from 1978 year-
end levels. 
--imports of Iranian crude oil 
have been reduced 
--existing contracts for imports 
of foreign crude oil were 
broken and supplies diverted 
for sale on the world spot market 
--the decrease in domestic crude 
oil production is unexplained 
United States 1979 crude oil stocks have 
been increasing over year-end 1978 levels. 
West Coast 1979 crude oil stocks have also 
increased. 
Measurement of crude oil supplies has three integral 
components: 1) foreign imports; 2) domestic production; and 
3) stocks. Crude oils from particular countries and regions 
2-1 
differ in specific gravity, metals content, and other quali-
tative aspects which are very significant to the purchaser. 
These qualitative differences are not recorded in published 
data, but must be kept in mind when discussing crude oil supplies. 
Stocks include storage in refinery tanks, cargos in 
tankers, ships, tank trucks, railroad tank cars and pipelines. 
The level of stocks can fluctuate in relation to pending changes 
in demand, seasons, crude oil prices, production estimates, 
~conomic, and political climates among other factors. 
A. Crude Oil Imports 
Free world crude oil production is approximately 47 
million b/d of which 63% is produced by countries belonging to 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The 
United States, which consumes 30% of world production, produces 
8 - 9 million b/d and imports the remainder of its crude oil 
1/ 
supplies.-
First quarter 1979 United States imports of foreign crude 
oil averaged 6.2 million b/d. America is dependent on OPEC 
for the majority of this imported crude oil, and this reliance 
has steadily increased since 1973. In 1973, crude oil purchased 
from OPEC comprised 71% of total United States foreign imports. 
By 1978, this figure had increased to 82%. The sources of im-
ported crude oil most important to the United States in 1978 
were Saudi Arabia (15%), Nigeria (12%), and Venezuela (11%). 
These supply arrangements are in contrast to those of 1973 
when Venezuela was the largest United States supplier (27%), 
2/ 
followed by Canada (20%) and Saudi Arabia (12%).-
2-2 
Until December 1978, Iran was the second largest pro-
ducer of crude oil in the world. Iran provided 11% of the 
United States foreign crude oil imports in 1978, 8% in 1977, 
3/ 
and 7% in 1973.- Although this reliance made the United States 
very vulnerable to supply interruptions, other European and 
Asian countries were even more dependent upon Iranian oil. 
Japan, which imports virtually all of its crude oil, received 
4/ 
17% of its 1977 crude oil imports from Iran.-
The revolution in Iran has had a significant effect 
upon the world petroleum market. Iranian oil production had 
reached levels as high as six million b/d in early 1978, and 
accounted for 13% of 1978 Free World oil production. However, 
by October 1978 the country's political instability began to 
undermine its crude oil production. Strikes and slowdowns by 
oil field workers resulted in reduced production, and in late 
December, Iranian exports ceased completely. Production resumed 
after 69 days, but only at a rate of 3.5 - 4 million b/d. 
The full and continuing primary and secondary impacts 
of the Iranian reduction and recent OPEC sanctions on United 
States imports are not clear. As has been widely reported in 
the media, foreign crude oil imports into the United States, 
excluding imports to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, have 
declined since the curtailment of Iranian oil production in 
December 1978 and this trend continued after the subsequent 
resumption of limited production. However, this decline during 
the first five months of 1979 was from record-setting import 
levels experienced during the last quarter of 1978. To put this 
2-3 
decrease in perspective: in December, 1978, the United States 
imported 6.7 million b/d, whereas by May 1979, this had dropped 
by 800,000 b/d to 5.9 million b/d. However, when the first six 
months in 1979 are compared to the same period in 1978, crude 
5/ 
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A further aspect that clouds the crude oil imports 
picture, and has nearly gone unreported, is the United States 
government's continuing efforts to increase the volume of crude 
oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). From December 1, 1978 
2-4 
I 
through March 1979, the United States added approximately 
22,685,000 million barrels of foreign imported crude oil to 
6/ 
the SPR.- This is considered more fully in the discussion 
of crude oil stocks. 
The net decrease in Iranian crude oil production has 
had the effect of reorganizing the world crude oil market. The 
world market went from a condition of surplus to one of deficit, 
forcing those countries which were especially dependent upon 
Iranian crude oil to become intensively competitive in the world 
crude oil market. Before the revolution in Iran, much of the 
world's crude oil production was under long-term contract. 
Crude oil production in surplus to these contracts was sold on 
what is called the "spot market". 
The spot market has operated as a mechanism for pro-
ducers to sell supplies in surplus of contractual obligations. 
This market mechanism has long been used by the petroleum 
industry as a price indicator. When crude oil supplies are 
tight, price escalates. Inversely, when there is a surplus, 
price decreases. 
Since December, 1978, there has been a drastic rearrange-
ment in supplier-purchaser contractual relations. With the 
curtailment of Iranian exports, the spot market initially dried 
up. When the National Iranian Oil Company resumed production, 
although at reduced levels, they began canceling old contracts 
and allocating their production to the spot market. Because 
overall world supplies were tight, Iran was able to obtain 
significantly-higher prices for its crude oil. Other producing 
nations quickly followed suit. 
2-5 
Purchasers with cancelled contracts came under extra-
ordinary pressure to compete on the spot market for the newly-
freed crude oil supplies. The economic success producers 
experienced in resorting to the spot market encouraged further 
reallocation, and thus traditional supplier-purchaser relations 
have been upset and world crude oil production redistributed. 
Countries bidding actively on the spot market have purchased 
previously-contracted supplies, generating shortages elsewhere 
while pushing up prices. Japan has become an aggressive 
purchaser and has been successful in obtaining supplies of 
Indonesian crude oil. 
B. Domestic Production 
Whereas some OPEC and other producing countries tern-
porarily increased production during the height of the Iranian 
shutdown, United States production in the first six months of 
1979 actually decreased. In the first six months of 1978, 
7/ 
domestic crude oil production averaged 8,643,000 b/d.- By 
comparison, in the first six months of 1979, preliminary 
figures indicate the United States produced an average of 
8/ 
8,436,000 b/d of crude oil.- This 207,000 b/d average shortfall 
is the equivalent to the loss of 37,467,000 barrels of crude 
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This difference appears to be due to a steady decline 
in domestic crude production during the fourth quarter of 1978 
and the first quarter of 1979. From October 1978 to March 1979, 
9/ 
domestic crude production dropped 5%, or 461,000 b/d.- By 
comparison, the General Accounting Office estimated the United 
10/ 
States crude shortfall due to Iran to be 500,000 b/d.--
According to testimony presented to the Committee from 
Chevron U.S.A., decreasing domestic production, on the order of 
2% each year, must be expected as our oil fields become older 
2-7 
11/ 
and less productive.-- However, a substantive explanation 
for the more pronounced decline noted above has not been 
brought to light by the Committee's investigation. This drop 
in domestic crude oil production must be considered a significant 
factor of the national condition of fuel scarcity. 
Some attempts to explain this situation, offered in 
the media, have included inclement weather and mechanical failures. 
In testimony to the Committee, Chevron U.S.A. stated that domestic 
production cannot be accelerated on short notice as was the pro-
duction of other countries. However, preliminary data from the 
American Petroleum Institute indicates that following a marked 
decline in domestic production between October 1978 and February 
1979, production increased 249,000 b/d (3%) from March to April, 
12/ 
and then decreased through May and June. (See Graph 2) The 
United States was the only other oil-producing country besides 
Iran to show a crude production decrease in the first quarter 
13/ 
of 1979.--
C. Crude Oil Stocks 
Inventories of crude oil available to the refiners 
are known as stocks. In addition to crude oil at the refinery 
and in terminal storage tanks, companies consider all crude oil 
being transported in pipelines, tankers, rail tank cars, and 
truck tank cars as stocks. Many firms have predetermined volumes 
called minimum operating levels (MOLs). If stocks fall below 
the MOL, refiners believe their operations may be subject to 
interruptions by delivery delays, spot shortages, or other 
similar events. Such interruptions could in turn affect wholesale 
and retail operations. 
2-8 
• 
Crude oil stocks therefore have a critical role in 
the operations of the petroleum market. In analysis and 
commentary on the current crisis, there has been a tendency 
to make comparisons of United States stock levels as reported 
in December 1978 and December 1977. Such an analysis indicates 
a 9% decline which, it has been suggested, left the United 
14/ 
States unusually vulnerable.--
However, such a comparison fails to take into account 
the fact that stocks were abnormally high in late 1977 and 
early 1978. (See Graph 3) Throughout 1977, crude oil stocks 
continually increased as a substantial OPEC price increase had 
J 
been anticipated by year's end. This price increase had not 
materialized by early spring 1978, and so crude oil stocks de-
clined throughout the balance of the year, resulting in the 
above-mentioned lower levels in December 1978. 
COMMITTTEE ON FUEL SCARCITY 
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Through the first part of 1979, a concerted effort 
seems to have been made to increase crude oil stocks, while at 
the same time a national crude oil shortage was being stressed. 
(See Graph 3) It appears that stocks were lower than normal 
in the beginning of 1979 due to last year's draw down. And 
even with that draw down, crude stocks at the beginning of 
1979 were higher than at the beginning of 1977 and 1976. The 
Committee is unable to ascertain if these additions to crude 
oil stocks, above levels of prior years, during a time of product 
scarcity, were necessary. 
Since October 1977, the Department of Energy has been 
adding crude oil to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). At 
the end of 1978, the SPR stood at 66,860,000 bbl., and by March 
1979 it had climbed to 82,501,000 bbl. Measurements of crude 
stocks, including the SPR, show the highest inventory levels 
ever by the end of 1978. (See Graph 4) However, as the Depart-
ment of Energy had not installed pumping equipment, these crude 
oil stocks could not be utilized during the peak of the crisis. 
Most of the crude oil being used to create the SPR is 
imported crude oil. It is unclear how much of the fuel scarcity 
condition may have been alleviated through temporarily re-
directing these imports, but the refining and distribution of 
this crude and additional industry crude directed to inventories 
~I 
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D. The California and the PADD 5 Crude Oil Supply Perspective 
California and United States supply trends have not 
followed the same course in recent years. The United States 
is divided into five Petroleum Administration Defense Districts 
(PADDs). (See Figure 1) These districts are drawn on a geo-
graphical basis and California is contained within PADD 5. In 
addition to California, PADD 5 includes the states of Alaska, 
Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii. 
FIGURE 1 
PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFENSE (PAD) DISTRICTS 
"<)HT. N.DAK. 
·~ ID4Ho, 













' S. OAK. /- - - - .. ~ S 
·----.,i IOWA ':''...: 
NE&R. \ ; tL.L.. 
\-- 2.; 
·-·-·-- ..J. I 
l NO. 
TEX 
Department of Energy 
The geological separation by the Rockies of PADD 5 
from the rest of the United States is more than a convenient 
demarcation. Very little in the way of crude oil flows over 
the Rockies either into or out of PADD 5 by railcar, truck or 
pipeline. 
Due to this physical separation, California - PADD 5 
supply trends have not followed the same course as those of 
United States in recent years. Until mid-summer 1977, and the 
arrival1 of Alaskan North Slope crude oil, the West Coast was 
heavily dependent on foreign imports, California production and 
small amounts of Southern Alaskan production. 
2-12 
• 
In December 1976, California total crude oil receipts 
averaged 1,834,000 b/d. Of the total, domestic crude oil 
receipts averaged 980,870 b/d or 53%, while foreign imports, 
primarily receipts from Indonesia and the Middle East, averaged 
853,452 b/d or 47%. However, this trend has changed significantly 
in the last two years. By December 1978, domestic receipts, 
including 581,032 b/d of Alaskan North Slope crude oil, had 
grown to comprise 80% of total receipts, averaging 1,442,000 b/d, 
while foreign receipts dipped to only 20% of the 1,805,000 b/d 
16/ 
total, averaging 363,000 b/d.-- In contrast to the nation as 
a whole, California and PADD 5 are now dependent on domestic 
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In light of the transition from light imports to heavy 
domestic crude oils in 1977, the Iranian revolution appears to 
have had a minimal direct effect upon California receipts of 
crude oil. Since November 1977, this state has not received 
any Iranian oil, and Indonesia has been our primary source of 
imported foreign crude oil. (See Graph 6) Although imports 
from Indonesia declined in the first quarter of 1979, this 
decrease in volume was more than offset by increased imports of 
Saudi Arabian crude. As a result, total receipts of foreign 
crude in California for the first quarter of 1979 actually in-
17/ 
creased by 19,000 b/d over fourth quarter 1978 levels.-- This 
trend is in marked contrast to the national decline of imports. 
These figures indicate th?t, at l·~ast for the first 
quarter of 1979, there was not a crude oil shortage in California 
due to a decrease of foreign imports. Overall in California, 
from September 1978 through the first quarter of 1979, total 
crude oil receipts were relatively constant. (See Graph 7) 
Crude oil stocks in California and PADD 5 have followed 
national trends more closely than have crude oil imports. 
California crude oil stocks rose through 1977, followed by a 
draw down in 1978. (See Graph 8) This trend is also seen in 
PADD 5 figures. (See Graph 9) As of June 1979, preliminary 
data indicates that PADD 5 crude oil stocks were very close to 
1978 levels. California refinery crude oil stocks hit a low 
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Preliminary analysis of data indicates the Iranian 
shortfall, and subsequent rearrangement of world crude oil 
supplier-purchaser relationships, did not reduce California 
crude oil supplies through the first quarter of 1979. Foreign 
imports of crude oil into California were up slightly while 
domestic receipts of crude oil were down. 
Iran and the United States were the only oil-producing 
nations to show a decrease in crude oil production in the first 
part of 1979. The reasons for the decline in United States 
crude oil production are not clear. 
California crude oil stocks dipped to low levels in 
February 1979 and showed signs of being rebuilt in March of 1979. 
Preliminary data indicates that June 1979 West Coast crude oil 
stocks were at approximately the same levels as 1978. Nationally, 
crude oil stocks have been increasing through the first six 






o Refining of heavy crude oil requires 
special refining components. The 
utilization rates of such equipment 
are not published and therefore the 
efficiency of these units cannot be 
assessed with available data. 
0 California refineries have been pro-
cessing heavy domestic crude oil for 
many years and large volumes of Alaskan 
North Slope crude oil since 1977. 
o Although there are complaints about 
government regulations interfering 
with refinery expansions and modifi-
cations to be able to process heavy 
crude oil, there have been permits 
issued and projects initiated for 
such work. It is unclear to what ex-
tent government policies are inhibiting 
additional refinery retrofits or if other 
economic and strategic reasons are 
responsible. 
o California gasoline production dropped 
21% between December 1978 and March 
1979, while residual fuel oil pro-
duction increased. There is no 
thorough explanation for this shift 
0 
in refined product outputs. 
While industry gasoline stocks were 
drawn down substantially in the first 
quarter of 1979, it does not appear 
they were at minimum levels. Gasoline 
stock levels in PADD 5 did not drop 
below 1978 levels. 
3-1 
The adequacy of California's refinery capacity has 
emerged as the area of greatest uncertainty in the Committee's 
hearings and staff investigation to date. The Committee sought 
answers to the following questions: 
1) Are the types and capacities of 
California's refineries adequate 
to meet demand? 
2) Are existing California refineries 
being utilized to the fullest extent 
possible? 
3) To what extent are California re-
fineries equipped to process crude 
oils available now and likely to 
be in the future? 
There are 40 crude oil refineries in California with 
a reported capacity of 2,400,000 b/d. Eight of the largest 
oil companies in the state have 12 refineries with 1,751,000 b/d 
18/ 
capacity or 73% of California's total refinery capacity.--
These large refineries produce the majority of the state's 
gasoline. 
The isolation of PADD 5, described in the above dis-
cussion of crude oil supplies, is particularly relevant in 
understanding the California - PADD 5 refinery picture. 
California refining capacity makes up 80% of the total PADD 5 
19/ 
refining capacity.--
A. The Refining Process 
Each refinery is unique and varies in its ability to 
refine different types of "feedstocks" (inputs), to produce 
specific "product slates" (outputs), and in maintenance re-
quirements. Utilization of refineries is therefore a function 
of many variables including among others the complexity of 
the refinery, products desired, types and quality of crude oil 
3-2 
refined, and operable condition of refinery equipment. 
Capacity ratings reported to government regulatory 
agencies involve the "upstream" capacity, which is the amount 
of crude oil fed into the refinery's primary distillation unit(s) 
at the beginning of the refining process. Upstream refining is 
the initial distillation of crude oil whereby it is separated 
into its natural components. 
Often unmentioned in discussion of refinery capabilities 
is the capacity of the refinery's "downstream" equipment. Such 
equipment includes cokers, catalytic reformers, and catalytic 
hydrocrackers. For California, these operations involve the 
most important aspects of refining operations: the second-stage 
of the refinery process which upgrades distillates into pro-
ducts which meet set specifications, produces more gasoline 
from lower-grade distillates, and radically alters residual 
product from the primary distillation process into middle 
distillates and light products. 
Downstream equipment is not totally reliant on the 
upstream refining capabilities at a given refinery. Distillates 
can be purchased on the open market, and processed in downstream 
equipment independent of upstream refinery apparatus. Testi-
mony received by the Committee indicates that the downstream 
capacity of many California refineries have not been designed 
to receive and process the full volume of output from the initial 
distillation units. 
3-3 
B. Utilization Rates 
Utilization rates usually refer to the amount of crude 
processed by a refinery's upstream components and is expressed 
as a percentage of the "name-plate" or maximum potential. 
Industry witnesses indicated that a utilization rate of 95% 
name-plate capacity represents maximum use of a refinery. 
American Petroleum Institute statistics indicate that since 
1976, the highest single utilization of operable upstream 
refinery capacity for the United States in any given month was 
92.7%. In 1976, the United States' percentage of operable 
capacity utilized was 89%, in 1977 - 89.9%, and in 1978 it 
20/ 
dropped to an average of 88%.-- For the first six months of 
21/ 
this year, United States refinery utilization averaged 84.6%.--
(See Graph 10) COMMITTEE ON FUEL SCARCITY 
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PADD 5 data from the American Petroleum Institute 
indicate a decline in refinery utilization in the second quarter 
of 1979. The average utilization rates reported for April were 
84%, 81% in May, 82.9% in June, and 85.4% as of the first week 
22/ 
in July.-- By contrast, other PAD Districts reported higher 
utilization rates. The West Coast refining sector is therefore 
operating at 15-20% below its rated upstream name-plate capacity. 
Whereas the American Petroleum Institute and Federal 
Department of Energy collect information on percent utilization 
of capacity, completely unreported is the utilization of down-
stream refinery units. This secondary refinery capability is 
the essential element in the refining of heavier crude oils 
(Alaskan and California crude oil) into desirable light products. 
In testimony to the Committee, it was reported that 
downstream capacity is being utilized at rates which in some 
cases exceed 110% of normal capacity. This is possible as normal 
capacity is not necessarily equal to maximum capacity. Even 
though upstream refining capacity may not be totally utilized, 
the volume of unfinished products produced by initial distil-
lation which needs additional refining may well exceed downstream 
capacity. As mentioned above, these secondary processing units 
can also process middle distillates and residual oil obtained 
from other sources. 
The depth and complexity of refinery operations makes 
an assessment of utilization rates and efficiency of operations 
very difficult. This is especially true when attempting to 
3-5 
assess if the refining industry is fully utilizing available 
downstream equipment. Operation of refinery components are 
varJcd by the industry t<> produce a particular product slate. 
Variations in product output observed in California in the 
first quarter of 1979 indicate that changes in utilization are 
occurring. However, the lack of reported information concerning 
downstream equipment leaves many questions unanswered. 
C. Feedstocks (Crude Input to Refineries) 
The issue of quality differences between types of 
crude oils has been pointed to as a factor affecting product 
output. Feedstock quality, in addition to refinery hardware 
and operating efficiency, is an essential factor influencing 
refinery product slates, and was repeatedly emphasized by many 
of the Committee's witnesses. 
Basically, crude oil is a mixture of hydrocarbon 
molecules. Impurities such as metalics, sulfur and parafin, 
which are often associated with crude oil deposits, make each 
type of crude oil unique. All of these factors are closely 
considered when refineries are initially designed or later 
modified. Refiners are thus anxious to obtain crude feedstocks 
which complement their refinery design and thus permit maximum 
efficiency of operations. The limits to which refineries can pro-
cess crude oils they were not designed for varies on a 
facility-by-facility basis. 
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In general terms, California has had two types of 
crude oil available to it: A) light (high specific gravity) 
crude oil such as most Saudi Arabian and Indonesian crudes which 
are conducive to less complex refining processes; and B) heavy 
(low specific gravity) crude oil such as most Californian and 
Alaskan North Slope crude oils which require more complex down~ 
stream refining processes including reforming, coking, and 
catalytic cracking. Simple distillation of a barrel of light 
Indonesian crude oil gives substantially more light product than 
a barrel of heavier Alaskan North Slope crude oil. This basic 
difference represents how critical crude quality is in the 
refining process. 
By late 1976, the mix of California's refinery feed-
stocks averaged approximately 50% domestic crude oil and 50% 
foreign crude oil. However, with the arrival of Alaskan North 
Slope crude oil into California in April of 1977, foreign crudes 
(specifically Saudi Arabian) came to represent a smaller fraction 
of refinery feedstocks. (See Graph 11) California refineries 
began utilizing large quantities of heavy domestic crude in 1977 
and recent changes in crude oil inputs have been comparatively minor. 
The flexibility of individual California refineries to 
process different mixes of crude oil has been represented to be 
quite small. Alarmingly, the Committee has received testimony 
that California refineries have been designed to operate utilizing 
lighter crude oils heretofore obtained from foreign sources, and 
have difficulty in refining the larger proportions of heavy crude 
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Given recent developments on the world crude oil 
market, it appears that refinery feedstocks in California will 
never again have a high percentage of light foreign crudes due 
to the keen competition for light foreign crude oils on the 
world market and America's desire to stimulate domestic oil 
production. This means that California refiners will be forced 
to meet future demand with relatively heavy crude oil feedstocks. 
This transition, it is said, will have to entail the modification 
and expansion of downstream refinery capabilities in PADD 5 to 




Complicating this entire refinery issue still further 
is the growing demand for unleaded gasoline. Each year the 
automobile fleet is requiring more unleaded gasoline as new 
cars replace older vehicles which used leaded gasoline. Pro-
duction of unleaded gasoline adds pressure upon already-strained 
refinery capacity. It takes more refining time and therefore 
more capacity to produce a given amount of unleaded as opposed 
to leaded gasoline. Demand for unleaded fuel is anticipated to 
peak in the mid 1980's when the federal mileage standards are 
met. 
In testimony to the Committee, the industry made re-
peated statements that environmental regulations and Department 
of Energy pricing regulations have inhibited their investments 
in the highly-technical and expensive downstream refining equip-
ment that would allow them to better utilize heavy domestic 
crude oil. 
However, there have been m~ny applications and approvals 
for additions to California's refinery inventory both in terms 
of refining modifications and construction of new refineries. 
At least nine refinery expansions and four new refineries have 
been approved in the last two years. (See Figure 2) 
3-9 
FIGURE 2 
APPROVED REFINERY MODIFICATIONS/EXPANSIONS 
IN CALIFORNIA (77/78) 
Company 
ARCO 
Beacon Oil Co. 
Champlin Petroleum 











































































(5% increase in state capacity) 
B/CD = Barrels per calendar day 
SOURCE: The Oil and Gas Journal - March 20, 1978 and 
California Air Resources Board, Authority to 
Construct Applications 
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The statement that government red tape is inhibiting 
investments in refinery capacity to handle heavy crude oil is 
also confusing in light of existing refinery operations. Texaco 
indicated in their testimony to the Committee that their Wilmington 
refinery "basically runs on heavy sour crudes". Similarly, 
Exxon testified that their Benicia refinery operated entirely 
on Alaskan North Slope crude oil. Several other companies 
indicated they had either just completed or were currently con-
23/ 
templating refinery modifications. 
D. Refined Petroleum Product Output 
Production of refined petroleum products is a very 
complicated and flexible procedure involving variation of certain 
parameters according to the dictates of engineering and business. 
The parameters include such factors as crude feedstocks, refinery 
capabilities, and storage capacity. Engineering concerns involve 
repairs and maintenance of equipment, and the technical operations 
of refineries. Business concerns involve adjusting product slates 
to meet changing market strategies, scheduling "down time", 
setting product inventories and rates of production for various 
products. 
The Committee staff has focused upon trends in pro-
duction rates, product inventories, and refinery down time to 
highlight factors in production that have contributed to fuel 
scarcity in California. 
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The most alarming trend is that gasoline production in 
PADD 5 and California was severely depressed during the first 
months of 1979. (See Graphs 12 and 13) Gasoline production 
in California dropped 21% (199,935 b/d) from December 1978 to 
24/ 
March 1979, from 958,096 b/d to 758,161 b/d.-- This drop seems 
unexplainable in the face of crude supplies and market conditions. 
California data for periods beyond the first quarter 1979 is 
not available to determine if this trend has continued. 
However, preliminary data for the second quarter of 
1979 from the American Petroleum Institute for PADD 5 indicates 
that while production increased slightly in the second quarter 
of 1979,it was still below December 1978 levels. In the first 
two weeks of July 1979, gasoline production in PADD 5 was up 
to 1,090,000 b/d~ but this figure was still 6% below the 
25/ 
1,163,000 b/d produced in December 1978.--
It is interesting to note that the depression in 
gasoline output has been accompanied by an increase in residual 
fuel oil production. (See Graphs 13 and 14) In March 1979, 
residual fuel oil production in California was at an all-time 
26/ 
high of 516,290 b/d.-- A similar increase is seen in PADD 5 
residual fuel oil production, as preliminary statistics show 
a 31% rise from early February to late March (487,000 b/d to 
639,000 b/d). During the second quarter, the PADD 5 data 
indicate that residual fuel oil production dropped back to lower 
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As was mentioned above, a complex array of factors 
determines what production from refineries will be during any 
given time period. Whatever the reason, the trends discussed 
above indicate that at the time when it would be expected that 
refineries would be producing more gasoline to ease the fuel 
scarcity in California, just the opposite was occurring. 
One particular factor which may account for some of 
this shift in products is the number of refinery shutdowns for 
maintenance and emergency repairs. Witnesses from major oil 
companies testified that many of the region's larger refineries 
have been partially or totally out of service during 
~-14 
• 
portions of the first five months of 1979. Much of this re-
finery down time is attributable to 11 turnarounds", i.e., in-
stallation of new equipment and routine maintenance. 
Due to the significant proportion of total California 
capacity that major refineries represent, down time at any one 
refinery can have a significant impact on refined product 
availability. This is especially true for gasoline, as gasoline 
capacity in California is primarily concentrated in relatively 
few large refineries. The trends in production discussed above 
may have been in part the result of down time at certain re-
fineries. For example, Chevron's catalytic cracker at Richmond 
was shut down from February 16 through April 23, cutting gasoline 
28/ 
production by some 28,000 b/d.-- Other shut downs have occurred 
29/ 
elsewhere in the state and in PADD 5.--
The frequency and timing of company "turnarounds 11 has 
been questioned. In interviews between Committee staff and the 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, the beliefs of ex-
perienced refinery workers were conveyed to the Committee staff 
that refinery down time was becoming increasingly more frequent 
than in previous years. They maintain companies appear to have 
stepped up the frequency and thoroughness of their maintenance 
programs in what the Union believes is marked contrast to past 
practices of utilizing refineries and their equipment for much 
longer time periods between repairs. 
The implication of this discussion to the fuel scarcity 
situation is obvious. The statements made by the Oil, Chemical 
and Atomic Workers Union have been disputed by industry officials. 
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Testimony before the Committee by company representatives indi-
cated that additional shutdowns had been planned for the spring 
of 1979 and were intentionally postponed to continue producing 
gasoline without interruptions. These witnesses stated that 
these actions had been taken in an effort to avoid additional 
gasoline shortages due to routine maintenance. 
It was suggested to the Committee that another reason 
for the shift in products may have been increased demand for 
heating oil due to the long winter. Such a market situation 
would cause refiners to shift product slates to produce heavier 
products (heating oils) at the expense of lighter products (gaso-
line). The contribution to such a program that would be required 
of West Coast refineries, however, is unclear. In testimony 
before the Committee, Mr. Douglas Robinson, Deputy Administrator, 
Economic Regulatory Administration of the Department of Energy, 
indicated that the federal government was not looking to PADD 5 
refineries for assistance in this year's effort to build up 
heating oil stocks f6r next winter. 
In addition to trends in production and refinery down 
time, some interesting trends can be observed in gasoline in-
ventory levels. As mentioned earlier, product inventories are 
an integral part of understanding how the industry adjusts pro-
duction. 
Nationally, gasoline stocks were at a very high level 
in 1977, and a substantial draw down occurred in 1978. (See 
Graph 15) This is similar to the trends observed in crude stocks. 
~-1R 
• 
PADD 5 and California gasoline stocks were drawn down through-
out 1977. However, stocks began to climb again in late 1978 
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In 1979, gasoline inventories have shown a marked 
decrease in PADD 5. Stocks dropped from 30,693,000 barrels 
in late January to 24,257,000 barrels by late April, a drop of 
30/ 
21%.-- However, this trend was not as pronounced in California 
through March. (See Graph 17) 
As was mentioned in the discussion of crude stocks, 
companies have minimum operating levels (MOLs) below which stocks 
are not drawn down to insure continuous operation of facilities . 
This is also true for product inventories, and according to 
the American Petroleum Institute, approximately 35% of the 
industry's total inventories of gasoline are thereby rendered 
31/ 
unavailable.--
It is not clear at this time if the draw down of 
gasoline inventories observed in PADD 5 in the beginning of 
1979 represents a drop approaching MOL. This seems highly un-
likely, as even with the draw down, stocks never dropped below 
their 1978 levels. (See Graph 16) Information supplied to the 
Committee by Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) indicates that 
ARCO reached MOL for gasoline in early May 1979. Similar data 
from other major companies, though promised to Committee by 
the Company's Sacramento representative, has not been forthcoming. 
American Petroleum Institute preliminary data seems to indicate 
on a national and regional level that gasoline stocks have not 
been utilized on an industry-wide basis to MOLs (the greatest 
~I 
extent possible) in 1979.-- Draw down to MOLs would have 
certainly resulted in increased fuel availability. 
3-19 
E. Summary 
The issue of refinery capability and utilization has 
emerged as the least certain aspect of the Committee investi-
gation. Utilization rates of upstream components are low on 
the West Coast, which may be due to reliance upon heavy domestic 
crude oils. Utilization rates of downstream equipment are not 
available, and it is thus difficult to assess how efficiently 
heavy crude oil is being refined in California. 
Industry spokesmen have indicated refinery expansions 
and modifications to allow for more efficient utilization of 
heavy crude oil have been inhibited by government regulations. 
While this may be true, empirical evidence, including large 
volumes of heavy crude oil currently being refined in California 
refineries and numerous applications for refinery modifications 
and expansions, raises questions concerning this assertion. A 
better understanding of other economic and strategic factors 
that may be involved in such investment decisions is necessary. 
These issues will undoubtedly play an important part in 
California's energy future. 
Decreased gasoline production by California refineries 
in the beginning of 1979 must have contributed to the gasoline 
crisis. The reason for this decline is unclear, but refinery 
down time and record levels of residual fuel oil production 
on the West Coast in the spring of 1979 may have contributed to 
this situation. Cautious distribution of gasoline inventories 
may have also contributed to the fuel scarcity. 
3-20 
It is incumbent on the Legislature to determine the 
degree to which environmental and price control regulations are 
factors which inhibit investment in modification and expansion 
of California refineries, or whether there are other stronger 
influences such as corporate marketing strategies, tax pro-
visions, economic or strategic factors which are influencing 
the decision not to invest in California refinery capacity. 
This issue is of particular importance to California's 
energy future and to the Legislature as it is a long-term 
problem which must be understood and solved soon if we are to 









IV. DEMAND FOR GASOLINE 
"Conspicuous consumption" by Californians 
does not appear to be "the" cause of fuel 
scarcity. 
Figures on increased gasoline demand in 
1979, while high in January and February, 
dropped significantly in March and April. 
May 1979 demand measurements were below 
1978 levels. 
Significant increases in industrial gaso-
line purchases early in the year appear 
to have made a substantial contribution 
to the shortfall for private consumers in 
May. 
Economic growth, population growth, and 
increases in the number of registered 
vehicles and outstanding drivers' licenses 
have contributed to increased gasoline 
demand in California. 
Increased gasoline exports to other western 
states and decreased imports of gasoline 
from the Gulf Coast and the North West 
appear to have made a major contribution 
to the fuel scarcity situation . 
4-1 
The third area the Committee staff has explored is 
that of demand for refined petroleum products. In the round 
of accusations of "who" is responsible for the current shortage, 
the finger has been pointed at the California motorist. Offi-
cials of the federal government and industry have inferred that 
Californians brought the fuel crunch upon themselves through 
excessive consumption. 
In testimony, the Committee was told by major oil 
company witnesses that demand for gasoline by consumers had 
increased drastically, making it difficult for the industry to 
keep pace. These witnesses expressed the belief that the tight 
world market for crude oil in 1979, combined with heavy demand 
for refined products, were the largest contributing factors to 
the fuel scarcity. 
A. Distribution as Measurement of Demand 
So-called "demand" is not measured by the amount of 
fuel consumed by the end user, i.e., the motorist. Instead, 
distribution of petroleum products from the primary storage 
of refiners to the next level in the distribution chain is 
recorded as the indicator of demand. Therefore, demand figures 
are not measures of actual consumption by end users, but indi-
cate only how much of a given product has been distributed. 
Since complete statistics on petroleum products are not kept or 
required by government agencies once they leave the refinery, 
little is known of the size of the inventory that may be contained 
in pipelines, tankers, distribution storage tanks, tank cars, 
4-2 
tank trucks, service station tanks, and other bulk storage 
facilities. 
Keeping in mind that demand measurements are only the 
distribution of products, examination of gasoline distribution 
data compiled by the State Board of Equalization indicate that 
in January and February, 1979, distribut~ons were 7.6% higher 
than for the same period last year. However, in March and 
April, 1979, distributions leveled off and were only .45% above 
last year's levels. In May, distributions were 2.8% less than 
1978 levels (due in part to the federal allocation program). 
(See Figure 3) With the uncertain storage capacity in the 
distribution system mentioned above, it is possible that end 
gasoline consumption, by California motorists, might not have 
increased at anywhere near the rates publicized in January 
and February. 
FIGURE 3 
Gasoline Distributions: 1979 
Millions of Gallons 
Percent change from 
1979 1978 same monthz 1978 
January 965.2 907.9 6.3 
February 941.8 863.7 9.0 
March 1,004.8 999.1 0.6 
April 962.0 959.5 0.3 
May 998.4 1,027.3 (2.8) 
Five months 4,872.2 4,757.5 2.4 
SOURCE: State of California, Board of Equalization 
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B. Factors Affecting Demand 
Demand for gasoline, while increasing throughout the 
nation in the past few years, has been climbing in our State at 
a rate above the national average. However, direct comparisons 
of demand levels between states is misleading, given the strong 
correlation between gasoline consumption and economic activity. 
California's economic growth has meant that individuals and 
businesses have purchased more vehicles and taken more trips 
for work and pleasure. 
Wage and salary employment in California were up 7.3% 
in 1978, compared to a 4.3% nationwide increase. Similarly, 
personal income in the state rose 13.9% last year, while 
33/ 
nationally it increased only 11.7%.--
In addition to this increase in economic growth, 
California demographics show two unique features that have 
not been examined in the round of accusations. Total popu-
lation in California increased 1.9% from July 1, 1977 to July 1, 
1978, while the national increase was only 0.8% over the same 
34/ 
time period.-- Moreover, the number of outstanding drivers' 
licenses in California increased by 2.9% in 1978, a rate of 
35/ 
growth faster than the growth in population.-- Such demo-
graphic trends may have a significant impact on gasoline usage. 
And yet, Californians use fewer gallons per vehicle 
than the average American motorist. California was also below 
the national average for gallons consumed per capita in 1976 
and 1977 and 37th among states in monthly per-vehicle gasoline 
36/ 
consumption (63 gallons).-- The only West Coast states with 
.. 37/ 




In the first few weeks of the gas crisis there is no 
doubt that California consumers intensified their own problem 
by "tank topping". Industry officials have pointed out that 
the average size of credit card purchases decreased as consumers 
insured their tanks were full. There were numerous reports of 
individuals storing large quantities of gasoline for private use. 
There is no way to determine how much of the demand for gasoline 
in California during this time period was the result of such 
panic buying. 
However, motorists were not the only sector guilty of 
so-called "tank topping". It is likely that every link in the 
distribution system (pipeline companies, wholesalers, jobbers -
retail outlets) accelerated their purchases. It was particularly 
evident that industrialjcommerical demand for gasoline in-
creased long before consumers began to worry about fuel scarcity. 
Mr. Frank P. Alcock, past President of the Purchasing 
Management Association of Los Angeles (a commercial buyers' 
organization), informed the Committee that a "commodity alert" 
was issued to members of the Association in late 1978. This 
alert, a verbal notification, informed members of possible 
shortages in fuels and petrochemical supplies. 
The Los Angeles Times reported that many businesses 
with large vehicle fleets which need gasoline began increasing 
stocks as early as late 1978 at the first signs of trouble in 
Iran. 
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According to the Times, 
In the first four months of (1979), 
jobbers and refiners who buy from 
Shell and sell to commercial accounts 
generated 74% increased demand in 
Southern California and a 55% jump 
in the San Francisco area over the 38/ 
same period last year. 
The article also discussed similar trends for other major suppliers. 
While such a prudent business practice is understandable, 
this source of demand seems to have been overlooked in many analyses 
of the fuel scarcity situation. However, due to a lack of recorded 
data concerning gasoline storage beyond the refinery gate, the 
contribution of accelerated business purchases to the overall 
shortage cannot be accurately assessed. And yet, the sporadic 
increases in distribution in January and February can be attri-
buted, at least in part, to precautionary industrial/commercial 
purchases. In the same Los Angeles Times article, a Chevron 
executive said that his company could have had a 95-100% allocation 
in May 1979 without the increase in industrial demand during the 
39/ 
first part of the year.--
D. In,terst'}te Imports and Exports of Gasoline 
Still another critical element affecting overall 
California supplies of refined products is the role California 
refineries play in meeting the demand of other western states 
for refined products. 
Although California must import gasoline to meet its 
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In the first quarter of 1979, imports declined while the rate 
of exports increased. California exported 21,144 b/d more 
gasoline in the first quarter of 1979 than in the same period in 
1978. However, gasoline imports were 4,188 b/d less than the 
1978 rate. When combined, these changes result in a net decrease 
of 25,332 bbl/day of gasoline in California during the first 
40/ 
quarter of 1979 when compared to the same time period last year.--
In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Douglas Robinson, 
of the Department of Energy, stated that this figure could be as 
high as 80,000 b/d. The majority of these imports are from the 
Gulf Coast, and it has been suggested to the Committee that this 
area was more severely effected by the national drop in foreign 
imports of crude oil. With less crude available on the Gulf 
Coast, less gasoline would be available for ~xport to the West 
41/ 
Coast. 
E. Transportation Patterns 
Short fuel supplies, long service station lines, and 
high prices have had a great influence on transportation patterns. 
There have been increases reported in carpooling (15% since 
April), bus use (14% over pre-shortage levels), and commuter 
42/ 
train patronage.-- CalTrans reports decreases in peak commuter 
hour freeway driving in Southern California. 
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According to CalTrans, freeway traffic flow in Los 
Angeles began to gradually decline in early April with signi-
ficant reduction being reported by the first week of May. Un-
fortunately, drivers have begun to resume their former habits. 
CalTrans reports that average daily traffic had been reduced as 
much as 14% during the week of May 7-11 (odd-even was instituted 
May 9th) and was still 2% lower during the week of June 18-22 . 
• 
PERCENTAGE WEEKLY CHANGES IN 
AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC ON 
THE 42 MILE DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES FREEWAY LOOP 
WEEK DIFFERENCE 
April 2 - 6 -0-
9 - 13 -0-
16 - 20 -2 
23 - 27 -3 
30 - May 4 -5 
May 7 - 11 -14 
14 - 18 -13 
21 - 25 -10 • 28 - June 1 -10 
June 4 - 8 -5 
11 - 15 -2 
18 - 22 -2 
SOURCE: Cal Trans, Office of Traffic 
4-9 
F. Summary 
Excessive demand for refined petroleum products by 
Californ:\a motorists does not appear to have been "the" cause 
of the gasoline crisis. While in January and February 1979 
demand for gasoline (which is a measure of distributions by 
refineries, not consumption by end users) was up significantly 
over last year's levels, by March and April it was back to only 
slightly above 1978 figures. In May 1979, gasoline demand was 
actually lower than last year. Economic growth and increases 
larger than the national average in the number of registered 
vehicles, population, and outstanding drivers' licenses, 
indicate that accelerated demand for gasoline in this state 
should be expected, and is not "conspicuous consumption". 
While the long lines at the pumps may have been due 
in part to tank topping by consumers, the level of gasoline 
purchases by industrial users early in the year undoubtedly 
were significant contributors to the severe fuel scarcity 
situation in May. Moreover, California is the major gasoline 
supplier for much of PADD 5, and an increased level of gasoline 
exports, combined with reduced imports, further exacerbated 
the scarcity situation. To simply point a finger at the 
California public, as did many federal and industry officials, 




SOURCES OF INFOHMATION 
The Committee has obtained its information through 
testimony provided at six Committee hearings, and limited data 
obtained from the American Petroleum Institute, the federal 
Department of Energy, and the California Energy Commission. 
There are significant limitations to the data the 
Committee has obtained from these sources. Information supplied 
to the Committee by the state Energy Commission on a statewide 
basis is unavailable after the first quarter of 1979. State 
statute requires companies to report data to the Commission once 
a quarter, and there is a time lag between the closing of the 
reporting period and the compilation of the data by the Commission. 
United States Department of Energy data, available only 
through March 1979, is published on a national and regional 
basis. Although data is reported to the Department of Energy 
on a company-by-company and statewide basis, it is considered 
proprietary and has been denied to the Committee. Committee 
staff are continuing their efforts to obtain this data . 
The American Petroleum Institute (API), an industry 
trade association, is the only available data source updated 
on a regular and timely basis through weekly and monthly publi-
cations. API cautions that its data is preliminary and it 
defers to Department of Energy (DOE) statistics whenever possible. 
DOE data has thus been utilized in this report whenever possible. 
In addition to data collection and analysis, the 
Committee staff has interviewed representatives of the Department 
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of Energy, the State Energy Commission, Department of Finance, 
refiners, labor unions involved in the petroleum industry, 
wholesalers and marketers of both crude oil and refined petroleum 
products, other petroleum industry analysts, congressional 
staffs, United States and State Department of Justice investi-





EXPLANATION OF GRAPHICS 
Graphs utilized in this report were prepared using 
Tektronix computer equipment at the Senate Office of Research. 
The date of preparation is included on each graph (PR-date). 
The sources of data utilized in preparation of each 
graph are as follows: 
Graphs 1, 2, and 3: Department of Energy (DOE), 
Monthly Energy Review, June, 1979, and American Petroleum In-
stitute (API), Monthly Statistical Bulletins, April-June, 1979. 
Graphs 4, 15: DOE, Monthly Petroleum Statements, 
1975 - 1978. 
Graphs 5, 6, and 7: California Energy Commission (CEC), 
Quarterly Fuels and Energy Summary (QFES), Origin of Crude 
Oil Receipts Report (Form OR-02). The figures for domestic 
receipts in Graph 5 represent the sum of Interstate and Intra-
state receipts of crude oil from form OR-02. 
Graph 8: CEC, QFES, Refinery Stocks Report (Form OR-06) 
and Oil Production Report (OP-01). Crude stocks data represents 
the sum of crude oil stocks from form OR-06, and crude stocks 
on lease, in pipelines, and at tank farms from form OP-01. 
Graphs 9, 12, 14 and 16: DOE, Monthly Petroleum 
Statements, 1977 - 1978, and API, Weekly Statistical Bulletins, 
1979. Note that the line labeled "1979" on these four graphs 
represents weekly data and the monthly demarcations on the 
horizontal axis are therefore approximate references to the 
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corresponding month on the "1979" line. While the use of 
weekly data unfortunately results in the greater variations 
observed in the "1979" line, this was necessary as API weekly 
statistics are the only recent data available for PADD 5. The 
lines labeled "1977" and "1978" represent official DOE statistics. 
OR-04). 
Graph 11: CEC, QFES, Feedstock Report (Form OR-01). 
Graph 13: CEC, QFES, Refinery Output Report (Form 
Graphs 17, 18, and 19: CEC, QFES, Finished Product 
Supply and Distribution Report, (Form OM-01). Gas stocks 
data represents the sum of the beginning storage statistics 
for premium, regular, low lead/unleaded, and unspecified gasoline. 
Gas Imports data represents the sum of the above categories 
for interstate receipts and foreign import receipts. Gas export 
data represents the sum of the above categories for interstate 
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